Common-value contests with asymmetric information

Karl Wärneryd

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 525-527

Abstract: We consider two-player, perfectly discriminatory, common-value contests (or all-pay auctions), in which one player knows the value of the contested object with certainty, and the other knows only its prior distribution. We show, among other things, that in equilibrium the players win with equal probability. This contrasts with a large class of imperfectly discriminatory contests in which the uninformed player wins with a strictly greater probability than the informed player.

Keywords: Contest; Asymmetric information; All-pay auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D72 D82 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:525-527

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.022

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