Unfolding the mystery of false-name-proofness

Nanyang Bu

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 559-561

Abstract: We study the general problem of public choice. We consider environments where agents’ identities may not be observable. A “rule” associates a preference profile with an alternative. An agent may create fictitious identities and submit multiple preference relations under them. We study false-name-proofness, the requirement that no agent should ever gain via such operations. Our main result is that if a rule is anonymous, strategy-proof, and population monotonic, then it is false-name-proof; if the preference domain contains only strict preference relations, the converse also holds.

Keywords: Public choice; False-name-proofness; Anonymity; Strategy-proofness; Population monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:559-561

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.06.011

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