A test of stability in a linear altruism model

Christos Ioannou, Shi Qi and Aldo Rustichini

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 1, 85-89

Abstract: Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.

Keywords: Linear altruism; Trust game; QRE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 C72 C92 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:1:p:85-89

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.007

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