Quality cut-offs in procurement auctions

Mridu Prabal Goswami

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 2, 148-151

Abstract: Recently the Government of India used procurement auction mechanisms with endogenously determined minimum quality. We find these auctions have no equilibrium in continuous symmetric monotonic pure strategies. This may substantiate the use of auction mechanisms with exogenously determined minimum quality.

Keywords: Procurement; Auction; Minimum quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:2:p:148-151

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.020

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