Estimation of social preferences in generalized dictator games

Yves Breitmoser ()

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 2, 192-197

Abstract: To statistically infer the motives underlying pro-social behavior, econometric models of choice are required. Such inference is comparable across studies if the choice model yields estimates that are precise in-sample and robust out-of-sample. Analyzing two extensive dictator game data sets, I find that structural models of choice prevent significant overfitting (contrary to regression models), structural models with generalized error structure fit the choice pattern, and random utility models yield robust identification of subject types (contrary to random behavior and random taste models). The random utility model for ordered alternatives provides robust estimates across games and is therefore suited for analyses.

Keywords: Social preferences; Dictator game; Stochastic choice; Estimation; Cross validation; Prediction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C50 C72 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:2:p:192-197

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.012

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