A note on reciprocity and modified dictator games

Timo Heinrich () and Joachim Weimann

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 2, 202-205

Abstract: This note presents results from modified dictator games in which the payoff-relevant game is either chosen randomly or by the recipients. We do not observe reciprocal behavior when recipients choose the game: Dictators do not condition their donations on the game chosen by recipients.

Keywords: Modified dictator games; Reciprocity; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:2:p:202-205

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.08.004

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