Investment decisions under hidden competition

Paulo J. Pereira and Manuel Rocha Armada

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 2, 228-231

Abstract: We present a model adequate for investment decisions in duopolies under total hidden competition. In this competitive context all potential entrants remain unrevealed until they decide to move into the market. The value-functions and the optimal entry thresholds are derived.

Keywords: Hidden competition; Duopolies; Real options (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:2:p:228-231

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.029

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