Persuasion and learning by countersignaling

Kim-Sau Chung and Péter Eső

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 3, 487-491

Abstract: We model countersignaling (i.e., very high types refraining from signaling) arising from the tradeoff between persuasion and learning in a signaling game. We assume that the agent has imperfect private information regarding his/her productivity, which the signaling action provides additional verifiable information about. A higher-type agent benefits more from providing such objective, albeit imprecise, “proof” for the market, but may also gain less from learning about his/her productivity. When the latter effect dominates the former for the very high types, the equilibrium exhibits countersignaling: very high and low types pool on refraining from signaling, and only the medium types signal. Under certain conditions, the countersignaling equilibrium is the unique pure-strategy perfect sequential equilibrium.

Keywords: Signaling; Countersignaling; Persuasion; Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176513004497
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:3:p:487-491

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.002

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().