Greediness and equilibrium in congestion games

Sergey Kuniavsky and Rann Smorodinsky

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 3, 499-503

Abstract: We study the class of congestion games for which the set of Nash equilibrium is equivalent to the set of strategy profiles played by greedy myopic players. We show these two coincide iff such games are played over extension-parallel graphs.

Keywords: Congestion games; Equilibrium; Greediness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:3:p:499-503

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.005

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