Fiscal decentralization, fiscal rules and fiscal discipline

Bilin Neyapti ()

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 121, issue 3, 528-532

Abstract: Fiscal decentralization (FD) and fiscal rules (FR) are institutional mechanisms that are implemented by varying degrees in increasing number of countries. This paper investigates empirically the effect of FR on the effectiveness of FD in achieving fiscal discipline. Panel evidence strongly supports that balanced budget and expenditure rules help FD to achieve this goal, while debt rule has a direct disciplinary effect.

Keywords: Fiscal institutions; Fiscal decentralization; Fiscal rules; Budget deficits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H72 H77 O2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:121:y:2013:i:3:p:528-532

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.006

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