Cheating to win: Dishonesty and the intensity of competition

Edward Cartwright and Matheus L.C. Menezes

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 1, 55-58

Abstract: We argue that the intensity of competition within a group or organization can have an important influence on whether or not people cheat. To make this point we first work through a simple model of strategic misreporting in the workplace. For low and high levels of competition we show that, in equilibrium, few are predicted to misreport. It is for medium levels of competition that misreporting is predicted to be highest. We test this prediction experimentally and find good support for it. This finding has implications for the design of incentive structures within groups and organizations.

Keywords: Cheating; Deception; Misreporting; Competition; Lying (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:1:p:55-58

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.10.016

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