An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers

Volker Hahn

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 2, 132-135

Abstract: Drawing on the canonical New Keynesian model, we assess the impact of central bankers’ term duration on governments’ appointment choices. We show that longer terms induce the government to appoint more conservative central bankers, which is socially desirable.

Keywords: Term length; Conservative central banker; New Keynesian model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:132-135

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.010

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