An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions

Gadi Fibich and Gal Oren

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 2, 190-191

Abstract: We prove that the maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions is the same for all bidders. Our proof is elementary, and does not require that bidders are risk neutral, or that the distribution functions of their valuations are independent or smooth.

Keywords: Asymmetric auctions; First-price auctions; Maximal bid; All-pay auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:190-191

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.034

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