Simultaneous screening and college admissions

Wei-Cheng Chen and Yi-Cheng Kao

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 2, 296-298

Abstract: We analyze a simultaneous screening problem in competition among top schools. The model predicts that when the second best school has similar prestige to the best one it could attract better students by choosing the same entrance examination date.

Keywords: Decentralized two-sided matching; Early decision; School competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:296-298

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.016

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