Third-party punishment and counter-punishment in one-shot interactions

Loukas Balafoutas, Kristoffel Grechenig and Nikos Nikiforakis ()

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 2, 308-310

Abstract: This paper presents experimental evidence from a simple three-person game showing that many individuals are willing to avenge third-party punishment in one-shot interactions. The threat of counter-punishment has a large negative effect on the willingness of third parties to punish selfish behavior. In spite of this, the extent of selfish behavior is identical to that in a treatment without counter-punishment opportunities. We discuss explanations for this puzzling finding.

Keywords: Third-party punishment; Counter-punishment; Norm enforcement; One-shot games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D70 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:308-310

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.11.028

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