Are elections debt brakes? Evidence from French municipalities

Aurélie Cassette and Etienne Farvaque

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 2, 314-316

Abstract: We show that voters are fiscal conservatives, although in the long run only: while the average (over the mandate) level of debt has a negative impact on the probability of reelection, pre-election debt accumulation by incumbents increases their probability of reelection. As the negative impact becomes larger as the debt level becomes higher, it compensates for the short run effect. Elections thus appear as a disciplining device, even if a weak one.

Keywords: Debt; Elections; Municipalities; Political business cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 H74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Are Elections Debt Brakes? Evidence from French Municipalities (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:314-316

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.022

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