Ambiguity and perceived coordination in a global game

Daniel Laskar ()

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 122, issue 2, 317-320

Abstract: In a global game, larger ambiguity is shown to decrease the amount of coordination each player perceives. Consequently, small uncertainty tends to select the Pareto dominated equilibrium of the game without uncertainty. Implications for models of financial crises are drawn.

Keywords: Global game; Ambiguity; Coordination; Equilibrium selection; Financial crises (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 D82 G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:122:y:2014:i:2:p:317-320

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.12.018

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