Do practice rounds affect experimental auction results?

Jay Corrigan (), Matthew Rousu and Dinah Pura T. Depositario

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 1, 42-44

Abstract: Researchers use practice rounds to familiarize participants with experimental auction mechanisms. We find a positive correlation between practice bids and bids submitted in later rounds. We consider three explanations for this correlation: a behavioral anchoring effect, a tendency for some auction participants to be more free-spending, and misconception of the experimental auction’s demand revealing qualities.

Keywords: Experimental auctions; Practice rounds; Anchoring; Misconceptions; Spendthrift effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 Q1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176514000226
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:1:p:42-44

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.014

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().