A public firm in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

Hamid Beladi, Avik Chakrabarti () and Sugata Marjit

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 1, 79-81

Abstract: We visit the role of privatization in the location decision of firms in an industry where no firm can produce all varieties demanded. We demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium locations are socially optimal, in the presence of a publicly owned firm, notwithstanding the degree of privatization.

Keywords: Product-differentiation; Privatization; Price-discrimination; Spatial-competition; Firm-location (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L42 R32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176514000433
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:1:p:79-81

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.029

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().