Does truth win when teams reason strategically?

Jeannette Brosig-Koch, Timo Heinrich () and Christoph Helbach

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 1, 86-89

Abstract: We study behavior in the race game with the aim of assessing whether teams can create synergies. The race game has the advantage that the optimal strategy depends neither on beliefs about other players nor on distributional or efficiency concerns. Our results reveal that teams not only outperform individuals but that they can also beat the “truth-wins” benchmark. In particular, varying the length of the race game we find that the team advantage increases with the complexity of the game.

Keywords: Race game; Strategic reasoning; Team decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Does Truth Win When Teams Reason Strategically? (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:1:p:86-89

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.016

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