Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts

Francis Flanagan

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 2, 113-117

Abstract: In the many-to-one matching model with contracts, I provide new necessary and new sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable allocation. These new conditions exploit the fact that one side of the market has strict preferences over individual contracts.

Keywords: Matching; Stability; Consistent substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:113-117

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.040

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