Information asymmetry and reentry

Andreas Harasser

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 2, 118-121

Abstract: We model a reputation game, in which a sequence of short-run players chooses if to interact with a long-run player. Although beliefs may be identical, choices may be different, as not-interacting can lead the long-run player to improve on effort.

Keywords: Reentry; Information asymmetry; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:118-121

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.036

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