The strategy of manipulating joint decision-making

Jin Yeub Kim and Heung Jin Kwon

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 2, 127-130

Abstract: We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers’ joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers’ value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the better outside option is critical in determining whether communication is truthful, overselling, or ineffective.

Keywords: Collective decision-making; Communication; Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:127-130

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.034

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