The nucleolus of large majority games

Sascha Kurz, Stefan Napel and Andreas Nohn

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 2, 139-143

Abstract: Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal, and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small.

Keywords: Nucleolus; Power measurement; Weighted voting games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:139-143

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.041

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