Optimal policy intervention, constrained obfuscation and the social value of public information

Luca Colombo and Gianluca Femminis

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 2, 224-226

Abstract: We study the welfare implications of public information precision in a beauty contest framework allowing for optimal stabilization policies and information obfuscation. When policy makers’ ability to obfuscate information is constrained, increasing public information precision can be welfare improving.

Keywords: Public information; Optimal policy; Obfuscation; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D82 E10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:224-226

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.004

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