Monetary incentives versus class credit: Evidence from a large classroom trust experiment

R. Andrew Luccasen and M. Kathleen Thomas

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 2, 232-235

Abstract: This paper reports an experimental investigation of a trust game using either cash or class credit as incentives to participants. We recruit from two auditorium classes. In one class, each token has cash value; in the other, each token is worth extra-credit points added to the students’ overall average at the end of the semester. The results indicate that using extra-credit points to motivate participants generates qualitatively similar data on average as participants incentivized with cash. We do find a difference in behavior with second movers who expect a low grade, but those incentivized with class credit are closer to the game theoretic prediction.

Keywords: Experiment; Trust; Incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:232-235

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.012

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