Biasing selection contests with ex-ante identical agents

Kohei Kawamura and Ines Moreno de Barreda

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 2, 240-243

Abstract: This note shows that when the designer of a contest wishes the winner have high ability, she is better off giving a head start to one of the contestants even if they are ex-ante identical. If the contestants are ex-ante asymmetric, the designer should give a head start to the one who is more likely to have high ability.

Keywords: Contest; Selection; Head start; Favouritism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:2:p:240-243

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.020

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