Consumer poaching, brand switching, and price transparency

Christian Schultz

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 3, 266-269

Abstract: This paper addresses price transparency on the consumer side in markets with behavioral price discrimination which feature welfare reducing brand switching. When long-term contracts are not available, an increase in transparency intensifies competition, lowers prices and profits, reduces brand switching and benefits consumers and welfare. With long-term contracts, an increase in transparency reduces the use of long-term contracts, leading to more brand switching and a welfare loss. Otherwise, the results are the same as without long-term contracts.

Keywords: Behavioral price discrimination; Oligopoly; Price transparency; Competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:266-269

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.024

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