Destructive behavior in a Fragile Public Good game

Maximilian Hoyer, Nadège Bault, Ben Loerakker and Frans van Winden ()

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 3, 295-299

Abstract: Socially destructive behavior in a public good environment–like damaging public goods–is an underexposed phenomenon in economics. In an experiment we investigate whether such behavior can be influenced by the very nature of an environment. To that purpose we use a Fragile Public Good (FPG) game which puts the opportunity for destructive behavior (taking) on a level playing field with constructive behavior (contributing). We find substantial evidence of destructive decisions, sometimes leading to sour relationships characterized by persistent hurtful behavior. While positive framing induces fewer destructive decisions, shifting the selfish Nash towards minimal taking doubles its share to more than 20%.

Keywords: Public good; Destructive behavior; Spite; Relationship; Laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Destructive Behavior in a Fragile Public Good Game (2014)
Working Paper: Destructive Behavior in a Fragile Public Good Game (2014)
Working Paper: Destructive behavior in a Fragile Public Good game (2014)
Working Paper: Destructive Behavior in a Fragile Public Good Game (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:295-299

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.023

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