Are leniency programs too generous?

Julien Sauvagnat

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 3, 323-326

Abstract: I present a simple model of collusion in which the competition authority offers leniency rates contingent on the number of firms that report information. The optimal leniency policy involves what I refer to as a single informant rule—that is, leniency should be given only when a single firm reports information. The single informant rule allows to increase expected sanctions compared to the first informant rule, which overall improves cartel deterrence.

Keywords: Antitrust law and policy; Cartels; Leniency; Informant rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176514001141
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:323-326

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.015

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().