Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty

Stefan Terstiege

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 3, 341-344

Abstract: I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable.

Keywords: Performance evaluation; Principal–agent; Moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 D86 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:341-344

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.014

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