Equilibrium bids in practical multi-attribute auctions

Mingxi Wang and Shulin Liu

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 3, 352-355

Abstract: This article proposes a nonlinear scoring rule which transforms multiple attributes of a bid into comparable dimensionless ones. Practically, the buyer can use it to select the most competitive winner. For risk-neutral bidders, we characterize a symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium and find that as the number of bidders increases the equilibrium quality improves, whereas the equilibrium price decreases.

Keywords: Multi-attribute auctions; Bidding strategy; Winner determination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:352-355

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.021

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