Effects of supervision on tax compliance: Evidence from a field experiment in Austria

Katharina Gangl, Benno Torgler, Erich Kirchler and Eva Hofmann

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 123, issue 3, 378-382

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment on tax compliance, focusing on newly founded firms. As a novelty the effect of tax authorities’ supervision on timely tax payments is examined. Interestingly, results show no positive overall effect of close supervision on tax compliance.

Keywords: Tax compliance; Tax evasion; Field experiment; Deterrence; Supervision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 H26 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:123:y:2014:i:3:p:378-382

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.03.027

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