Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result

Conal Duddy

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 1, 14-16

Abstract: We consider methods of electing a fixed number of candidates, greater than one, by approval ballot. We define a representativeness property and a Pareto property and show that these jointly imply manipulability.

Keywords: Approval Voting; Committee; Manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:1:p:14-16

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009

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