Bid coordination in split-award procurement: The buyer need not know anything

Parimal Bag and Jianpei Li

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 1, 143-146

Abstract: Anton and Yao (1989) show that in split-award procurement auctions bidders coordinate their bids to sustain high buyer price. We relax their assumption that the buyer has full information about the suppliers’ production costs and restore the coordination outcome.

Keywords: Split award; Bid coordination; Buyer information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:1:p:143-146

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.005

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