Penalties and the deterrence of unlawful collusion

Joseph E. Harrington

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 1, 33-36

Abstract: This paper investigates the size of penalties required to deter cartel formation. Allowing the penalty to be increasing in duration within the infinitely repeated game framework, penalties do not need to be as severe as previous research would suggest.

Keywords: Collusion; Antitrust; Crime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:1:p:33-36

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.010

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