The dynamic relationship between disability onset, earnings, and disability insurance application and receipt

Perry Singleton

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 3, 374-377

Abstract: At the time of disability onset, the effect of disability insurance on earnings is limited by the finding that work-prevented respondents, who account for the majority of benefit claims, have negligible earnings regardless of application status.

Keywords: Health; Labor supply; Disability insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H5 I3 J2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:3:p:374-377

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.06.016

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