Economics at your fingertips  

The unique equilibrium in a model of sales with costly advertising

Michael Arnold () and Lan Zhang

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 3, 457-460

Abstract: We demonstrate that the Varian (1980) model of sales has a unique Nash equilibrium when firms incur costly advertising to compete for informed consumers. The equilibrium is symmetric. In particular, with costly advertising, the asymmetric equilibria highlighted by Baye et al. (1992) do not arise.

Keywords: Advertising; Sales; Unique equilibrium; Price dispersion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 D83 L19 L89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.005

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

Page updated 2021-06-30
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:3:p:457-460