Is there adverse selection in the life insurance market? Evidence from a representative sample of purchasers

Timothy Harris and Aaron Yelowitz

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 124, issue 3, 520-522

Abstract: This paper examines asymmetric information in the life insurance market using data that link life insurance holdings with death records for a representative sample of purchasers. This analysis finds no compelling evidence for adverse selection in a broad age cohort.

Keywords: Adverse selection; Advantageous selection; Life insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:124:y:2014:i:3:p:520-522

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.029

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