Which business model for e-book pricing?

Danilo C. Dantas, Sihem Taboubi and Georges Zaccour

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 1, 126-129

Abstract: We characterize and compare equilibrium pricing strategies in a marketing channel in two scenarios. In the first scenario, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale prices of the two versions of a product, i.e., tangible and digital. and the retailer their prices to consumer. In the second scenario, the players use a revenue-sharing contract for only the digital version, while the competing version is managed by a wholesale price contract. The problem is inspired from a pricing controversy in the e-book industry.

Keywords: Marketing channels; E-book industry; Wholesale-price contracts; Revenue-sharing contract; Applied game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D3 L81 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:1:p:126-129

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.020

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