Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeovers, and merger control
Dragan Jovanovic and
Christian Wey
Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 1, 32-35
Abstract:
We analyze the impact of passive partial ownership (PPO) on horizontal mergers. We show that antitrust authorities ignoring the effects of previous PPO acquisitions invite sneaky takeovers: a PPO is strategically used prior to a full takeover to get a merger approved which is in fact detrimental to consumers.
Keywords: Horizontal mergers; (Passive) Partial ownership; Antitrust; Synergies; Sneaky takeovers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 K21 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
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Working Paper: Passive partial ownership, sneaky takeover, and merger control (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:1:p:32-35
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.08.006
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