The von Neumann–Morgenstern stable sets for the mixed extension of 2×2 games

Elena Inarra, C. Larrea and Ana Saracho

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 1, 70-73

Abstract: This paper studies the von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets for the mixed extension of 2×2 games when only single profitable deviations are allowed. We show that games with a strict Nash equilibrium have infinite vNM stable sets, and games without a strict Nash equilibrium have just a unique vNM stable set. A characterization of the strategy profiles that belong to the vNM stable sets is provided. We also show that in games without a strict Nash equilibrium the vNM stable set always contains a Pareto optimal strategy profile.

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; von Neumann and Morgenstern stable sets; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:1:p:70-73

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.025

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