On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture

Shaofang Qi

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 2, 229-232

Abstract: The universally beneficial manipulation conjecture of Campbell and Kelly states that for a social choice rule, if everyone gains as a result of any optimal manipulation, then the rule satisfies universally beneficial manipulation, i.e., everyone gains as a result of any manipulation, optimal or not. We prove the conjecture for three alternatives and any number of individuals. We also construct a counterexample in a general form with more than three alternatives and at least two individuals.

Keywords: Social choice functions; Manipulations; Gains; Losses (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:2:p:229-232

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.013

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