Merchant internalization revisited

Rong Ding

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 3, 347-349

Abstract: Merchant internalization has been proposed as a key reason for biases in the setting of fees in payment card platforms. It has been shown to hold under several specific models of imperfect competition. This paper unifies and extends the existing payment card literature by showing that merchant internalization holds under a very general model of competition.

Keywords: Merchant internalization; Payment cards; Interchange fees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:347-349

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.009

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