Formal and informal job search

Luca Merlino

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 3, 350-352

Abstract: I develop a model where workers decide how hard to look for a job via formal and informal search channels. The intensity of formal search determines an individual’s arrival rate of offers. The strength of investment in informal search translates into a job contact network in which job offers are transmitted. There are two equilibria, one with high formal search and one with high informal search. The former Pareto dominates the latter.

Keywords: Unemployment; Job search; Endogenous job contact networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 D85 E24 J63 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:350-352

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.008

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