Efficient club formation in a frictional environment

Benoit Julien, John Kennes and Moritz Ritter

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 3, 372-375

Abstract: We study the assignment of agents to clubs in a frictional market environment. Club entry is endogenous and clubs compete by posting reserve prices in a competing auctions game prior to the agents’ decisions regarding which club to visit. The competing auctions equilibrium is constrained efficient and the reserve price in general will not be zero.

Keywords: Club goods; Competing auctions; Directed search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D71 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:372-375

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.016

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