Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities

Qiang Fu, Qian Jiao and Jingfeng Lu

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 3, 376-380

Abstract: This paper investigates whether a contest organizer should disclose private information about bidders’ abilities in a multi-prize all-pay auction. Bidders’ abilities are randomly distributed and observed by the contest organizer; the organizer decides whether to disclose this information publicly. We find that concealing the information elicits higher expected total effort, regardless of the distribution of abilities. In addition, we find that the rent-dissipation rate of the contest does not depend on the disclosure policy.

Keywords: All-pay auction; Disclosure; Concealment; Stochastic abilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:376-380

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.014

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