The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes

Xuyuan Liu and Jingfeng Lu

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 3, 422-425

Abstract: We establish the effort-maximizing rule of allocating heterogeneous prizes when contestants privately observe their effort efficiencies. With ex ante symmetric players and increasing virtual effort efficiency, an all pay auction maximizes the total expected effort.

Keywords: All pay auction; Grand contest; Split contest; Subcontest; Virtual effort of efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:422-425

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.026

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