On the efficient provision of public goods by means of biased lotteries: The two player case

Jörg Franke and Wolfgang Leininger

Economics Letters, 2014, vol. 125, issue 3, 436-439

Abstract: In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of bias and lottery prize and the conditions that guarantee efficient public good provision in equilibrium.

Keywords: Public good provision; Biased lotteries; Charities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:125:y:2014:i:3:p:436-439

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.024

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