A note on stochastic public revelation and voluntary contributions to public goods
John Spraggon (),
Lucía Andrea Vergara Sobarzo and
John Stranlund ()
Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 126, issue C, 144-146
We report the results of experiments designed to investigate the effects of random public revelation of individual choices on voluntary contributions to a public good. Varying the number of subjects whose contributions are made public, we find that public revelation always leads to higher contributions. Revealing the choices of three and five individuals leads to higher contributions than revealing one individual’s contribution, but there is not a significant difference between revealing the contributions of three or five subjects.
Keywords: Public goods; Public revelation; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:126:y:2015:i:c:p:144-146
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